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I Introduction 
 
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996 (Code of Rights) 
confirms that patients are entitled to health services that are provided with reasonable 
care and skill, and that comply with legal, professional, ethical and other standards.1  
“Reasonable care and skill” signifies the need for competent practice; patients are entitled 
to trust that their health provider has the necessary skills to safely provide health services.  
Likewise, a patient can expect a practitioner to practise in a manner that adheres to all 
relevant ethical duties, whatever those duties might be.  Health providers have a 
corresponding duty to uphold the rights set out in the Code of Rights.2 
 
With these patient rights and provider duties in mind, the focus of this paper is on the 
regulatory framework established by the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 
2003 (the Act) and, in particular, the existence of a discretionary notification regime for 
health practitioners to report concerns about incompetent colleagues.  This paper 
discusses how the Act came about, how it seeks to assure practitioner competence, the 
process for notification of competence concerns and the reasons why discretionary 
notification was adopted for practitioners.   
 
Using a patient-centric approach, it then questions whether discretionary notification is 
appropriate to ensure that the health and safety of the public is protected and whether 
ethical obligations act to address any possible deficiencies.  It is suggested that 
professional and workplace pressures, and concerns about career advancement, may act 
to prevent health practitioners from exercising their discretion to notify, creating a risk 
that incompetent practice will go unreported and expose patients to harm.  It is also 
argued that unless ethical obligations are consistent across the regulated professions and 
are enforced by relevant agencies they will not provide an effective “back-stop” to 
discretionary notification.  Options for improvement or change are then canvassed, 
including the need for New Zealand based research into practitioner reporting behaviour 
and education and consistent guidance on the discretionary reporting threshold.  Finally, 
it is proposed that, subject to research findings and the effect (if any) of suggested 
improvements, mandatory reporting may need to be reconsidered, and a proposal for 
amendments to the current statutory regime is set out and discussed.     
 
  
1 Rights 4(1) and 4(2).  The Code of Rights is a regulation promulgated under the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994. 
2 Clause 2. 
LAWS 542 Anita Miller 199102449 
 
4 
 
II The Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003  
 
The Act, which came into force in September 2003, replaced 11 disparate, inflexible and 
outdated pieces of legislation3 that were considered unable to meet the changing needs of 
the health sector.  However, the real impetus for legislative change came from a number 
of “high profile medical scandals”4 that created significant public disquiet about 
professional self-regulation.   
A The Impetus for Change 
The 1988 Cartwright Inquiry5 into allegations about Dr Herbert Green’s experimental 
research into cervical cancer at National Women’s Hospital has been described as the 
“real beginning of New Zealand’s crisis of faith with the medical profession, particularly 
among women.”6  While the Inquiry resulted in the creation of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner and the Code of Rights, apparent problems with self-regulation kept 
coming to light.   
 
To illustrate, in 2000 the Gisborne Cervical Screening Inquiry7 considered the actions of 
pathologist Dr Michael Bottrill, who was found to have under-reported abnormal cervical 
smears.  Counsel for affected women argued that the signs that Dr Bottrill was not 
competent were ignored and that this evidenced a “lack of ‘internal morality’ by some 
pathologists involved.”8  Dr Bottrill also faced a civil claim9 and it was reported that the 
medical profession had “closed rank” in his support by testifying that his errors were 
“within an acceptable margin for competent cytopathologists, when an Australian review 
  
3 Some of which was over 50 years old, e.g. Physiotherapy Act 1949.  See Schedule 7 of the Act. 
4 Jonathan Coates “Mandatory Reporting of Incompetence” (2001) 114 NZ Med J 193. 
5 Dame Silvia Cartwright The Report of the Cervical Cancer Inquiry (1988).  The inquiry was prompted by 
a Metro magazine article entitled “An Unfortunate Experiment at National Women’s”, authored by Sandra 
Coney and Phillida Bundle and published in June 1987. 
6 Susan Rogers “Culling Bad Apples, Blowing Whistles and the Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act 2003 (NZ)” (2004) 12 JLM 119, at 122. 
7 A Duffy QC, D K Barrett and M A Duggan Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into the Under-Reporting of 
Cervical Smear Abnormalities in the Gisborne Region <www.csi.org.nz/report/csireport.pdf> accessed 10 
April 2010. 
8 Stuart Grieve QC and Antonia Fisher “Submissions to the Ministerial Inquiry” (12 September 2000) at 1.7 
<www.csi.org.nz/proceedings/submissions/grieve.doc> accessed 10 April 2015.  
9 Culminating in Bottrill v A [2003] 2 NZLR 721. 
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indicated that this was not the case.”10  Also in 2000, a respected Christchurch doctor and 
mayoral hopeful Dr Morgan Fahey was convicted and imprisoned for sexually abusing 
female patients over a 30 year period.  Described by the media as a “sexual predator in a 
white coat”11 it was later discovered that other doctors “knew or suspected”12 his 
unethical behaviour and that some had been told of the abuse directly by patients but had 
“refused to believe it, telling the women that no one else would either.”13   
 
Public concern about the adequacy of the existing systems was, perhaps, understandable 
in the face of these highly publicised cases.  Legislative change was therefore sought, in 
large part, to ensure that incompetent or bad practice could be identified early to enable a 
swift response and to minimise patient harm.14   
B  Competence and Competence Assurance 
The Act’s principal purpose is “to protect the health and safety of the public by providing 
for mechanisms to ensure that health practitioners are competent and fit to practise their 
professions.”15  Because of the potential for ever-changing concepts of competence, and 
the range of professions captured by the Act,16 competence is not defined.17  However, 
the “required standard of competence” is defined as meaning “the standard of 
competence reasonably to be expected of a health practitioner practising within that 
health practitioner’s scope of practice.”18  Authorities are required to set standards of 
  
10 Bronwyn Howell “Medical Misadventure and Accident Compensation in New Zealand: an Incentives-
Based Analysis” (2004) 35 VUWLR 857, citing and commenting on Miriyana Alexander “Bottrill Cover-
Up Astounds Lawyers: Doctors Closed Ranks” Sunday Star Times (26 September 1999). 
11 “Fahey – sexual predator in a white coat” (30 June 2000) The New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=138943> accessed 10 April 2015. 
12 R Briant “Sexual Abuse in the Doctor-Patient Relationship”, Business Information in Action Second 
Annual Medical Law Conference Paper, November 2000 as cited in above n 6. 
13 Above n 6. 
14 Helen Cull QC Review of Processes concerning adverse medical events (Ministry of Health, March 
2001). 
15 Section s3(1). 
16 The Act applies to 21 health professions regulated by 16 authorities.  Regulated professions include 
anaesthetic technicians, chiropractors, dentists, dental therapists and technicians, dispensing opticians, 
medical practitioners, medical laboratory scientists and technicians, medical radiation technicians, 
midwives, nurses, occupational therapists, optometrists, osteopaths, pharmacists, podiatrists, psychologists, 
psychotherapists, and physiotherapists.  
17 This was a deliberate drafting decision.  See Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Bill 2002 (230-
2) (reported from the Health Committee) at 8. 
18 Section 5(1). 
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clinical and cultural competence;19 a practitioner’s competence will be measured against 
these minimum requirements.  Whether a practitioner meets the standard in any given 
profession is a matter for the relevant authority established under the Act.20   What is 
clear from the standards of competence that have been set across the various professions 
is that competence is something more than good clinical (‘hands-on’) ability.  A 
competent practitioner will also have, among other things, good verbal and written 
communication skills (for interacting with both patients and professional peers), skills 
relevant to the management and planning of health care, and an understanding of and 
compliance with legal and ethical obligations. 
 
The mechanisms to achieve the Act’s purpose include a requirement of competence for 
registration21 and the need to hold an annual practising certificate in order to practise the 
profession.22   Relevantly, a person may be registered within a scope of practice if he or 
she is fit for registration, holds a prescribed (or equivalent) qualification and is 
“competent to practise within the scope of practice.”23  An authority may require an 
applicant for registration to take and pass an examination for the purpose of satisfying the 
authority that he or she is competent to practise in New Zealand.24  In turn, the practising 
certificate regime restricts the issue of a practising certificate where there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that “the practitioner has failed, at any time, to maintain the 
required standard of competence.”25  An authority must not issue a practising certificate 
unless it is satisfied that the practitioner does indeed meet the required standard of 
competence.26  Conditions may be imposed on a practitioner’s practice to assure the 
authority of their competence.27  Conditions may include practising under the supervision 
of another health practitioner, or preventing a practitioner from performing certain tasks. 
 
  
19 Section 118(i). 
20 D v Physiotherapy Board HC Wellington CIV 2006-485-1980, 15 October 2007 at [27] per MacKenzie 
J. 
21 Section 15(1)(c). 
22 Section 7(2). 
23 Section 15.  A scope of practice describes the profession by reference to words, an area of science, tasks 
to be performed, or illnesses or conditions to be diagnosed or treated: s 11. 
24 Section 19(5)(a). 
25 Section 27(1)(a). 
26 Section 29(1). 
27 Section 29(2).   
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When a practitioner holds a current practising certificate, an authority has a discretion to 
review his or her competence.28  Competence reviews are a critical tool for assuring 
competence, and can involve onsite visits to observe a practitioner in practice, an 
assessment of cases and clinical records, and interviews with the practitioner and 
professional colleagues, among other things.   While the form of a review is at each 
authority’s discretion,29 a practice visit by a competence review committee, followed by a 
written report to the authority, is common. 
 
Importantly, such reviews are not disciplinary, but are intended to be remedial and 
educative.  The fundamental question for an authority in any review is whether the 
practitioner’s practice of the profession meets the required standard of competence.30  If a 
practitioner is found to fall short of the required standard, then remedial orders must be 
made.31 Notably, an authority cannot cancel a practitioner’s registration for 
‘incompetence’; however it can put in place measures to restrict or prevent practice 
pending the completion of a competence review or until certain remedial orders have 
been fulfilled.32 
C Notification of Competence Concerns 
A key trigger for undertaking a competence review is the receipt of a notification made 
under s 34 of the Act.33  Relevantly, s 34(1) provides: 
 
If a health practitioner (health practitioner A) has reason to believe that 
another health practitioner (health practitioner B) may pose a risk of harm 
to the public by practising below the required standard of competence, 
health practitioner A may give the Registrar of the authority that health 
practitioner B is registered with written notice of the reasons on which that 
belief is based. 
 
As can be seen, a practitioner has a discretion whether or not to notify.  In deciding 
whether to notify, a practitioner is not required to form a definitive view that the other 
practitioner poses a risk of harm, or that that risk arises from incompetent practice.  It is 
  
28 Section 36(1).   
29 Section 37(1).  
30 Section 36(5). 
31 Section 38(1). 
32 Section 39(2) and (5). 
33 Section 36(2). 
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sufficient to have reason to believe that there may be questions about another 
practitioner’s competence.   
 
In contrast, s 34(2) creates a mandatory obligation on the Health and Disability 
Commissioner (HDC) to notify an authority of concerns on the same grounds.  Similarly, 
under s 34(3) an employer of a health practitioner who resigns or is dismissed for reasons 
relating to competence must promptly notify the authority of the reasons for the 
resignation or dismissal.  Importantly, no civil or disciplinary proceedings may be 
brought against a person making a notification, unless that person has acted in bad faith.34 
 
III Why Discretionary Notification? 
 
When submissions were sought on the concepts to be included in a single piece of 
legislation for health regulation, one of the proposals was that practitioners would be 
required to report colleagues who were believed to be practising below an acceptable 
standard.35  In turn, the notifying practitioner would be protected from civil and criminal 
liability provided they had not acted in bad faith or without reasonable care.36   
 
While 80% of respondents commenting on the proposal “supported mandatory reporting 
of practitioners believed to be practising below an acceptable standard”37 there was 
strong opposition from the medical profession.38 Concerns were raised around the 
“subjective interpretation” of the obligation, the risk of driving problems “underground”, 
vexatious reports, and practitioner resistance leading to enforcement difficulties.39  The 
values of the profession, and reliance on the “internal morality of professional groups to 
govern themselves”40 also formed part of the debate.   
 
  
34 Section 34(4). 
35 Ministry of Health Health Professionals’ Competency Assurance Bill Discussion Paper (September 
2000). 
36 Above n 35, at 16. 
37 Ministry of Health Summary of submissions on the Health Professionals’ Competency Assurance Bill 
discussion paper (February 2001) at 8.  
38 Kathleen Jackson and Malcolm Parker “Full Steam Ahead on the SS “External Regulator”? Mandatory 
Reporting, Professional Independence, Self-Regulation and Patient Harm” (2009) 17 JLM 29, at 31. 
39 Above n 4.  
40 New Zealand Medical Association “Submission to Health Select Committee on the Health Practitioners 
Competence Assurance Bill” at 4. 
LAWS 542 Anita Miller 199102449 
 
9 
 
In 2001 the Cull review41 looked at existing processes around adverse medical events, 
including a proposed amendment to the Medical Practitioners Act 1995 to require 
mandatory reporting; it identified that practitioners were often aware of incompetent 
practice but did not report it.  Cull concluded:42 
 
…mandatory reporting would overcome the difficulties experienced by 
professionals in the health system to refer their concerns to the appropriate 
bodies and provide an added protection for public safety. 
 
Notwithstanding the apparently overwhelming initial support for mandatory reporting, 
and Cull’s conclusion which suggested that mandatory reporting might provide a 
protective shield for practitioners, the Bill was drafted without the requirement.43  The 
New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA), a strong opponent of mandatory notification 
of competence concerns, welcomed the decision not to require mandatory reporting, 
stating:44 
 
This Bill is designed to improve the competence of health professionals.  
With the change away from mandatory reporting, the Bill will lead to safer 
environments for doctors and other health professionals to work in, and for 
patients.   
 
Interestingly, much less attention focused on the proposal for mandatory reporting of 
concerns about a practitioner’s mental or physical health as opposed to professional 
competence.  While this paper does not address the reporting of practitioner health 
concerns it is noted that s 45 of the Act creates a mandatory requirement for practitioners 
to notify an authority if there is reason to believe that another practitioner is unable to 
perform the functions required for the practice of the profession due to a mental or 
physical condition.45   
 
 
  
41 Above n 14.  
42 Above n 14, at 76. 
43 Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Bill 2002 (230-1), cl 33(1).     
44 “NZMA welcomes decision on Bill” (31 May 2002) Scoop News <www.scoop.co.nz/stories> accessed 
12 March 2015. 
45 This obligation extends to persons in charge of an organisation providing health services, employers of 
health practitioners, and a Medical Officer of Health. 
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IV Is Discretionary Notification Really Safer for Patients? 
 
It is not possible to confirm NZMA’s assertion that discretionary reporting is safer for 
patients.  No research has been conducted into the efficacy of discretionary reporting in 
New Zealand, and one difficulty must surely be that the number of concerns that go 
unreported is simply unknown.  Similarly, there is no objective evidence that 
discretionary notification creates an environment in which competence concerns are more 
likely to be raised or managed locally, either within the workplace or as part of quality 
improvement initiatives. 
 
There is also insufficient data to determine whether historical reluctance to report 
incompetent practice has changed.  Prior to the introduction of the Act only 17% of 
medical practitioners who underwent a competence review (a mechanism available under 
the Medical Practitioners Act 1995) had been reported by their professional colleagues.46   
No similar analysis of data has been undertaken for the various health professions 
regulated under the Act.  However, one HDC report suggests that some practitioners 
remain reluctant to raise competence concerns.  The case involved complaints against a 
medical practitioner regarding a number of failed sterilisation procedures.  A colleague, 
Dr B, had informally expressed his “disquiet” about the practitioner’s competence to the 
Medical Council, but he did not record his concerns in writing as requested by the 
Medical Council.  The HDC commented, critically, that: “Dr B did not formally report 
his concerns until the evidence of incompetence was incontrovertible.  By that stage it 
was too late”.47  In making this comment the HDC referred to the professional 
responsibility to raise concerns, and the need for patients to have faith that poor 
performance will not be “swept under the carpet”.48  Despite the criticism, no action was 
taken against Dr B.  The case illustrates an example of where notification to an authority 
that would likely have been required under a mandatory regime was not made under the 
discretionary regime until patient harm had already occurred, an outcome that is surely 
inconsistent with the patient safety focus of the Act.   
 
  
46 Sumit Raniga, Phil Hilder, David Spriggs and Mike Ardagh “Attitudes of Hospital Medical Practitioners 
to the Mandatory Reporting of Professional Misconduct” (2005) 118 NZ Med J 1227, citing Ian St George 
“Doctors whose Competence has been Reviewed under the Medical Practitioners Act 1995” (2003) 116 NZ 
Med J 1175. 
47 Dr Roman Hasil and Whanganui District Health Board.  A report by the Health and Disability 
Commissioner2005-2006(February2008) www.hdc.org.nz/media/30154/whanganui%20dhb%20feb08.pdf>  
at 89.  Accessed 16 March 2015.   
48 Above n 47, at 89. 
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This raises questions about whether notifications required to be made by the HDC and 
employers provide an effective counterbalance to the discretion given to practitioners.  
Arguably not.  The HDC will only become aware of a concern when there is a complaint 
or a notification from another agency, at which time the risk of harm has likely 
eventuated for the complainant.  Likewise, employers’ obligations arise at the end of 
employment.  Anecdotally, a number of employers are not aware of their obligations to 
report competence concerns.  Others bind themselves with confidential agreements 
following the breakdown of the employment relationship and seek to rely on their terms 
to avoid reporting.  In contrast to these ‘after the fact’ notifications, practitioners working 
alongside their colleagues are well placed to recognise and report competence concerns 
early.   
 
V Mandatory Notification in Australia 
 
In Australia, strong lobbying against mandatory reporting was unsuccessful.  Since 2010 
the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) has required 
practitioners to report “notifiable conduct”, including where a practitioner has “placed the 
public at risk of harm because the practitioner has practised the profession in a way that 
constitutes a significant departure from accepted professional standards.”49  Voluntary 
notifications may also be made for practice that is “below the standard reasonably 
expected.” 50      
 
Guidance issued by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency indicates that 
the threshold for mandatory reporting is high and that a “significant departure” is one 
which is serious and that “would be obvious to any reasonable practitioner.”51  Despite 
the mandatory requirement to report there is no statutory penalty for failing to do so.52   
 
Much like the justification advanced in New Zealand, the rationale for mandatory 
reporting was to ensure the safety of patients.  Nevertheless, it has been contentious.  
Critics argued that mandatory reporting “fosters a culture of fear, deters help-seeking, and 
fuels professional rivalries and vexatious reporting.”53  Debate continues around whether 
  
49 Section 140(d). 
50 Section 144(1)(b). 
51 “Guidelines for Mandatory Notifications” (March 2014) <www.medicalboard.gov.au/Codes-Guidelines-
Policies/Guidelines-for-mandatory-notifications> accessed 16 March 2015. 
52 Above n 51, at 13.  
53 Marie Bismark, Matthew Spittal, Tess Plueckhahn and David Studdert “Mandatory reports of concerns 
about the health, performance and conduct of health practitioners” (2014) 201 Med J Aust 399. 
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mandatory reporting is a reactive intrusion and an insult to the integrity of the 
profession.54   
 
Recent research into mandatory notifications in Australia concluded that it was too soon 
to draw any conclusions on the effects of mandatory reporting, but that many of the 
concerns raised by critics, and some of the benefits advanced by supporters, have not 
materialised.55  The authors observed that:56 
 
…supporters of mandatory reporting who heralded it as a valuable new 
surveillance system may be concerned by the low rates of reporting.  Part of 
the variation…might reflect true differences in [the] incidence of notifiable 
events, but it is also likely that differences in awareness of reporting 
requirements and differences in notification behaviour contribute to the 
variation.  
 
It is therefore unclear whether mandatory reporting has increased the likelihood of 
incompetent practice being notified, or whether patient safety has improved as a result.  It 
is also too early to identify whether the legislative compulsion to notify, which removes 
any choice in the matter, offers either protection or comfort against the critics concerns.    
 
VI Ethical Obligations 
 
One of the arguments raised against mandatory reporting in New Zealand (and Australia) 
was that ethical obligations already required practitioners to raise concerns about 
incompetent colleagues.  Following the removal of the proposed mandatory reporting 
requirement in New Zealand practitioners were cautioned that ethical obligations were 
likely to impose a de facto legal duty to report colleagues based on the legal duties under 
the Code of Rights.57  However, for that argument to stand, codes of ethical conduct need 
to create sufficiently clear standards for notifying competence concerns and relevant 
agencies must enforce those obligations.   
 
  
54 Malcolm Parker “Embracing the New Professionalism: Self-Regulation, Mandatory Reporting and their 
Discontents” (2011) 18 JLM 456 at 460. 
55 Above n 53.   
56 Above n 53. 
57 Jonathan Coates “Removal of the mandatory reporting provisions – only a Pyrrhic victory?” (2002) 115 
NZ Med J 1162. 
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Ethical obligations imposed from within a professional body form part of the internal 
morality of a profession.58  The Hippocratic Oath is a good example; so too is the NZMA 
Code of Ethics.  In addition to these internal controls of practitioner behaviour, the Act 
requires authorities to set standards of ethical conduct to be observed by practitioners.59   
The Act regulates a number of professions and therefore there are a number of ethical 
codes.  Some authorities have adopted or approved the codes developed by professional 
associations.  For example, the Medical Council has endorsed the NZMA Code of Ethics 
for medical practitioners.60  Similarly, oral health practitioners are advised that the Dental 
Council’s brief list of “Principles of Ethical Conduct for Oral Health Practitioners” 
should be read in conjunction with the Code of Ethics of the New Zealand Dental 
Association.61     
 
While some codes of ethics create a mandatory obligation to report competence 
concerns,62 other codes (or guidance on codes) merely encourage reporting.63  This raises 
two issues.  First, the lack of consistency undermines any argument that ethical 
obligations to report concerns are a sufficient counterbalance to the discretion to notify 
found in the Act.   This inconsistency also creates a situation where a de facto legal duty 
to report concerns may apply to some practitioners regulated under the Act but not to 
others.  Secondly, and significantly, there are real questions about the ability of an 
authority to set ethical obligations that exceed the statutory discretion to notify 
competence concerns.  Put simply, it is unlikely to be lawful for an authority to set a 
mandatory ethical obligation to report competence concerns.  This means that it is the 
professions themselves that can choose whether or not to establish an ethical obligation to 
report competence concerns, harking back to the days of professional self-regulation.   
 
  
58 Charlotte Paul “Internal and External Morality of Medicine: Lessons from New Zealand” (2000) 320 
BMJ 499. 
59 Section 118(i). 
60 Coles Medical Practice in New Zealand (12th ed, Medical Council of New Zealand, Wellington, 2013) at 
6.  
61 <www.dcnz.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Codes-of-practice/Statement-on-ethics.pdf>, accessed 30 April 2015.  
Somewhat problematically, access to the NZDA Code of Ethics is restricted to members of that association.  
As not all oral health practitioners will be NZDA members this raises questions about whether non-
members are appropriately apprised of their professional obligations simply by reference to the NZDA 
Code of Ethics. 
62 For example Pharmacy Council Code of Ethics 2011 (January 2011) at cl 6.3, p 15. 
63 For example Chiropractic Board Code of Ethics (February 2013) at cl 3.3.7, p 7, and Medical Council 
What to do when you have concerns about a colleague (December 2010) at cl 20. 
LAWS 542 Anita Miller 199102449 
 
14 
 
In any event, simply setting an ethical obligation to report concerns about incompetent 
colleagues is insufficient.  It must be shown that those ethical standards are adhered to 
and enforced in order to maintain patient trust and to uphold patient rights.  In terms of 
enforcement, the HDC, which investigates alleged breaches of patient rights, has never 
found a practitioner in breach for failing to report an incompetent colleague.  Likewise, 
the Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (HPDT), which hears and determines 
disciplinary charges against practitioners, has not addressed the question in a disciplinary 
context.  In the circumstances, the de facto legal duty is illusory. 
 
VII Practitioner Interests and Patient Safety 
 
It is trite to observe that the care of the patient is the first concern in any therapeutic 
relationship.  No practitioner would deny that upholding a patient’s rights is also a basic 
obligation.  Despite this, the factors that are said to impact on reporting behaviour fall 
into four indisputably practitioner-focused categories:64  
 
…uncertainty or unfamiliarity regarding the legal requirement to report; fear 
of retaliation; lack of confidence that appropriate action would be taken; and 
loyalty to colleagues that supports a culture of “gaze aversion.”   
 
The extent to which New Zealand practitioners are aware of the discretionary reporting 
provisions of the Act is unclear.  Even if there is an understanding that the Act creates a 
voluntary reporting regime, the ‘culture of fear’ is likely to have a chilling effect on 
exercising the discretion to notify.  Anecdotally, many practitioners consider making a 
competence notification about a colleague to be ‘career suicide.’  The stark choice, 
particularly for junior practitioners, is between career advancement (and job security) and 
patient safety.  In that respect, it can be readily assumed that it is ‘safer’ for practitioners 
to have the choice not to notify bad practice.  Thus, a consequence of discretionary 
notification is that a practitioner may choose not to notify in order to protect themselves, 
even after observing practice that may harm a patient.  This choice goes against what the 
Act sought to address.   
 
From a patient perspective, substandard practice may not be recognised until harm 
occurs.  At that point, while there is a right to complain65 and the possibility of cover for 
  
64 Above n 53.     
65 Code of Rights, Right 10.  
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a treatment injury,66 there may be questions about how the substandard practice went 
unchecked and why others did not intervene to prevent the harm.  Such questions have 
the potential to undermine public trust and confidence in health practitioners. 
 
Identifying and reporting bad practice goes hand in hand with protecting patient safety.  If 
practitioners accept that patient safety comes first at all times then their own interests are, 
theoretically at least, irrelevant.  That said, can practitioners protect themselves and 
patient safety by using different methods to report their concerns?  Two possible 
reporting methods, and the protection they may provide to both practitioner and patient 
interests, are considered below. 
A Protected Quality Assurance Activities 
The Act protects practitioner confidentiality with respect to declared quality assurance 
activities (QAAs) that have been approved for a particular organisation.67  QAAs are 
intended to improve the practice or competence of practitioners by assessing and 
evaluating circumstances that may affect the quality of health services.68  Practitioners 
participating in a QAA can be assured that, except in limited circumstances, information 
will not be disclosed outside the organisation and cannot be used against them for 
disciplinary purposes.69 
 
However, the disclosure of competence concerns within the protection of a QAA process 
means that an authority will not be made aware of the concern.  It is the authority that has 
a statutory power to assess and remediate practitioner competence; its decisions about 
managing competence concerns are made with the principal purpose of protecting the 
health and safety of the public at front of mind.  If competence concerns are not 
appropriately addressed by an organisation as part of a QAA process there could well be 
ongoing safety implications for patients.  Moreover, any later notification to an authority 
will not disclose the earlier (confidential) concerns or the efforts to address the 
deficiencies in the practitioner’s practice, potentially minimising the extent of the 
  
66 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 32. 
67 Section 53(1).  A QAA must have a sponsor, meaning a person or association of persons, under whose 
initiative and guidance the QAA is undertaken.  Broadly speaking, employer organisations (such as 
hospitals and District Health Boards) and professional associations have QAA processes in place, see for 
example Health Practitioners (Quality Assurance Activity – Auckland DHB) Notice 2013 
<www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/2013/0319/latest/DLM5497610.html?src=qs> accessed 15 May 
2015. 
68 See ss 52 to 63 of the Act. 
69 See s 59 and s 62. 
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incompetent practice and possibly affecting the authority’s response to the notification.  
Thus, while QAAs protect the practitioner it is less clear that they act to protect the public 
from incompetent practice in the long term.   
B The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (PDA) protects the identity of a whistleblower who 
discloses serious wrongdoing within an organisation.  Serious wrongdoing includes “an 
act, omission, or course of conduct that constitutes a serious risk to public health or 
public safety” and “an act, omission, or course of conduct by a public official that is 
…grossly negligent, or that constitutes gross mismanagement.”70  The PDA’s protection 
extends to immunity from criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings relating to the 
disclosure.71  In principle, the PDA could be used by a practitioner to raise concerns 
about seriously incompetent practice, or the failure of an organisation to address 
incompetent practice, without jeopardising career prospects.   
 
The PDA requires that the disclosure is made in accordance with internal procedures.  
Invariably, this requires disclosure within the organisation in the first instance.  A 
disclosure may only be made directly to an “appropriate authority” if the organisation 
does not take adequate steps to respond to the disclosure, where the head of the 
organisation is involved in the wrongdoing or where urgency is required.72  An 
appropriate authority includes the HDC and “the head of every public sector 
organisation”.73  An authority established under the Act would likely be regarded as an 
appropriate authority for the purpose of the PDA.   
 
Although the PDA provides protection for a ‘whistleblower’ practitioner there remains a 
genuine risk that the whistleblower will be known or identifiable within the organisation, 
and will suffer covert discrimination as a result of the disclosure.  Retaliatory action 
linked to the disclosure, including dismissal, may amount to a personal grievance but that 
protection would no doubt be cold comfort for a practitioner.74  Uncertainty about the true 
scope of the protection offered by the PDA may influence a practitioner’s decision about 
disclosure.  As with discretionary notification under the Act, a decision not to disclose 
  
70 Section 3. 
71 Section 18. 
72 Section 9. 
73 Section 3. 
74 Section 17 provides that where an employee who makes a protected disclosure under that Act claims to 
have suffered retaliatory action (including dismissal) from his or her employer or former employer the 
employee may have a personal grievance. 
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serious wrongdoing may be made to protect against the implications for that practitioner, 
regardless of the risk to the public.  The result is that the PDA might not be used by 
practitioners to report incompetent practice even when it is in the interests of patient 
safety to do so. 
 
VIII What Next? Options for Improvement or Change 
 
Having considered the discretionary regime, ethical obligations, and the factors that are 
likely to inhibit discretionary notification the next question is what can be done to ensure 
that practitioners report their concerns about bad practice.  The following options are 
proposed. 
A Research 
New Zealand based research into trends and behaviour around reporting of incompetent 
practice is required.  To date, no comprehensive research into competence notifications 
across the regulated professions has been undertaken.  Since 2011 the Ministry of Health 
has required authorities to report on the sources of competence notifications.  This data is 
available in the annual reports of the authorities, but requires compilation and analysis to 
determine the number of notifications made by practitioners compared to other sources.    
 
Analysis of this data will not identify incompetent practice that has gone unreported or 
the reasons for that.  A survey of practitioners across the regulated professions could 
inquire into circumstances where incompetent practice was not reported, circumstances 
where incompetent practice was reported through other means (e.g. QAAs or under the 
PDA) and the outcome of such reports, the perceived impediments to making 
notifications to authorities and the extent to which patient safety is a factor in deciding 
whether or not to make a notification.  The scope of practitioners’ current understanding 
of legal and ethical obligations regarding incompetent colleagues can also form part of 
the survey.  By offering anonymity, save for the participant’s profession and years of 
practice, such a survey could provide a frank picture of reporting behaviour in New 
Zealand, and may assist to determine whether there is indeed a reluctance to report 
voluntarily and how that might be fixed. 
 
A survey of practitioners might also be an opportunity to re-examine the various 
professions’ views on mandatory reporting.  While the medical profession, through the 
NZMA, has long been an opponent of mandatory reporting it may be that this view is not 
shared either by individual practitioners or across the 21 regulated professions.  This can 
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only be determined by seeking the views of all professions.  If the medical profession’s 
view is a minority view then it is questionable whether the voice of one (albeit important) 
profession should take priority over other professions on such an important factor for 
protecting patient safety.     
B Education 
It is likely that many practitioners are unfamiliar with the steps that can, or should, be 
taken when confronted with substandard practice.  There is a risk that leaving a junior 
practitioner to learn about when or whether to report competence concerns by following 
the example set by senior colleagues could entrench non-reporting behaviour.  Educating 
practitioners about their legal and ethical obligations is critical to practitioners meeting 
their duty to uphold patient rights as set out in the Code of Rights.75   
 
The need for education to address the legal and ethical obligations relevant to practice, 
including patient rights and the management and notification of competence concerns, 
can be reinforced by authorities when they set the prescribed qualifications for 
registration.76  Authorities can choose to designate only those qualifications that 
specifically address professional responsibilities alongside the broader clinical 
requirements for practice.  Those education providers who do not address such matters 
would need to adjust their programme to ensure that their students have a qualification 
that is relevant for registration in their chosen profession.  Authorities are also able to set 
competence programmes or recertification programmes for practitioners.77  Successful 
completion of such a programme, usually on an annual basis, is often used by authorities 
to demonstrate a practitioner’s competence for the purpose of issuing a practising 
certificate.  These programmes can specify a course of instruction and/or a pass in stated 
assessment as a necessary component.78  Accordingly, once registered, education and 
assessment about legal and ethical obligations can be set as an express requirement for 
practitioners as part of their ongoing professional development during the course of their 
careers.   
 
More broadly, authorities have a role in educating practitioners about competence 
notifications and competence reviews.  It is important that practitioners understand how a 
  
75 It is also relevant to meeting the principal purpose of the Act, which is to protect the health and safety of 
the public. 
76 Section 12. 
77 Sections 40 and 41. 
78 Section 40(1)(a) and (b) and s 41(1)(a) and (c). 
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notification is likely to be treated, the possible outcomes of notification, what a 
competence review involves and that competence reviews are not disciplinary processes.   
It is also important that practitioners understand that, if they notify in good faith, they 
have immunity from prosecution.79  While many authorities have information about 
competence reviews on their websites, regular and more targeted information sent 
directly to practitioners may be a more effective way of ensuring that individual 
practitioners understand the importance of raising concerns about incompetent practice 
and the implications of doing so.  
C Guidelines for Discretionary Notification  
The threshold for exercising the discretion to notify requires a practitioner to consider 
two factors: “risk of harm to the public” and “required standard of competence.”80  While 
‘public’ may reasonably be read as including any patient or possible patient of a 
particular practitioner, “risk of harm” is not defined by the Act and the phrase has not, to 
date, been interpreted by the courts.  The required standard of competence is a defined 
term that has been the subject of judicial consideration, but it cannot be assumed that 
practitioners will know what is meant by this phrase.  Guidance as to when the threshold 
for reporting may be met would assist practitioners.   
 
In 2010 the Health Regulatory Authorities of New Zealand (HRANZ), an informal group 
of the authorities established under the Act, issued a joint guideline with District Health 
Boards (DHBs) called “Agreed Guidelines for Competency Referrals.”81  The Guidelines 
do not directly address the required standard of competence, but do state that a risk of 
harm may be indicated by “a pattern of practice over a period of time that suggests the 
practitioner’s practice may not meet the required standards of competence”.82  However, 
the Guidelines are expressly intended for DHBs.  Many practitioners may not consider 
the Guidelines applicable to them, and in any event may not be able to readily locate 
them.  Although some authorities have developed their own criteria for determining 
whether a risk of harm may exist,83 consistency as to the meaning of ‘threshold’ phrases 
is preferable to ensure consistency of reporting across the professions.  HRANZ is an 
  
79 Section 34(4). 
80 Section 34(1). 
81 Available at <www.dietitiansboard.org.nz/webfm_send/31> accessed 30 April 2015. 
82 Above n 81 at 11.  
83 For example, the Medical Council states that a risk of harm may be indicated by “a single incident that 
demonstrates a significant departure from accepted standards of medical practice” or “recognised poor 
performance where local interventions have failed.”  “Definitions of risk of harm and risk of serious harm” 
(August 2004), Medical Council <www.mcnz.org.nz> accessed 24 March 2015. 
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appropriate group to issue guidance as to when the threshold for notification may be met.  
A useful starting point would be the guidelines developed by the Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency for mandatory notification in that country.  Those 
guidelines explain in simple terms whom they apply to, what is meant by the statutory 
tests, and sets out a decision-making ‘tree’ with the matters to take into account when 
considering making a notification. 
D Enforcement 
If reporting competence concerns is to be taken seriously by practitioners it may be 
necessary for egregious failures to report incompetent practice to have consequences.  
While notification under the Act is discretionary, for some professions there is an 
overarching ethical obligation set by the relevant professional body that requires 
competence concerns to be reported.  As noted above, the Code of Rights imposes a duty 
on practitioners to provide services that comply with legal, professional and ethical 
standards.  On the face of it, if a practitioner who is subject to an ethical obligation to 
notify incompetent practice does not report incompetent practice he or she will be in 
breach the Code of Rights.  The HDC, as the watchdog for health consumers, has a 
responsibility to ensure that practitioners meet their professional and ethical 
responsibilities when providing services.  It would be unfortunate indeed if health 
consumers had to wait for another ‘high profile medical scandal’ before real steps are 
taken to uphold a patient’s rights to services that meet a profession’s own ethical 
expectations. 
 
Authorities also have a role to play.  While there may be questions about an authority’s 
ability to set a mandatory ethical obligation to report competence concerns, the immunity 
from civil or disciplinary proceedings only applies when a discretionary notification has 
been made.  What happens when a discretionary notification is not made and it is said 
that a practitioner knew or ought to have known that a colleague was incompetent and 
that it was inappropriate not to have taken steps to raise the concern or to prevent the 
colleague from practising?  Under s 68(3) of the Act an authority has a discretion to refer 
questions about the appropriateness of a practitioner’s conduct to a professional conduct 
committee (PCC).  Unlike the authority itself, a PCC has a statutory power to lay 
disciplinary charges before the HPDT.84  Relevantly, a practitioner may be guilty of 
professional misconduct for “any act or omission that, in the judgment of the Tribunal, 
has brought or was likely to bring discredit to the profession.”85  The HPDT, which sets 
  
84 Section 80(3)(b).  A PCC can also recommend that an authority review a practitioner’s competence. 
85 Section 100(1)(b). 
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and enforces professional standards, has long held that to bring discredit is to bring harm 
to the “reputation and good standing” of the profession in the eyes of reasonable 
members of the public.86  It is not inconceivable that, on the right facts, a PCC might test 
the scope of professional misconduct with respect to a practitioner’s failure to raise 
concerns about an incompetent colleague.     
E Legislative Change – Mandatory Notification 
Two reviews of the Act have not resulted in any recommended changes to the 
discretionary reporting provisions.87  This may be because discretionary reporting is 
accepted as an appropriate (or pragmatic) legal response.  Alternatively, it may indicate a 
lack of enthusiasm by the legislature to re-engage in the debate.  Nevertheless, mandatory 
reporting could become necessary if the public loses confidence in the various 
professions’ preparedness to report incompetent practice under a discretionary regime.  
Subject to the outcome of any relevant research, including further proposed research in 
Australia into the effects of the mandatory reporting regime in that jurisdiction, and the 
impact (if any) of the measures suggested above, introducing mandatory reporting should 
be reconsidered.   
 
1. Mandatory Reporting Requirements 
 
The success of a mandatory reporting regime will very likely depend on two key and 
interrelated factors: the threshold for reporting should be high and the scope of the 
obligation to report should be clear.  Put another way, if practitioners are to be required to 
report their allegedly incompetent colleagues they should only be required to do so where 
the incompetent practice obviously, but objectively, poses a risk of serious harm to 
patients.  For example, s 34(1) could be amended as follows:  
 
If a health practitioner (health practitioner A) has reasonable grounds for 
believing that another health practitioner (health practitioner B) poses a 
risk of serious harm to the public by practising in a way that is a significant 
departure from the required standard of competence, health practitioner A 
  
86 An endorsement of the statement made by Gendall J in Collie v Nursing Council of New Zealand [2004] 
NZAR 74 at [28]. 
87 The Act was reviewed in 2007 and 2012.  In 2007 NZMA stated that it “has always been opposed to 
mandatory reporting in respect of competence issues…Our concern is that mandatory reporting of 
competence issues is likely to result in the issue being avoided, thus having the opposite effect to what is 
intended.”  New Zealand Medical Association “Review of the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance 
Act (HPCA) – Key Issues” (submission to Ministry of Health, 17 December 2007).  
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must give the Registrar of the authority that health practitioner B is 
registered notice of the circumstances and/or reasons giving rise to that 
belief. (amendments underlined). 
 
The proposed amendments would create a clearer objective standard for belief, in contrast 
to the current “reason to believe” which may be regarded as having at least some 
subjective element.  An objective standard ensures that a practitioner is not influenced by 
his or her personal views when considering making a notification, perhaps ensuring that 
patient safety is paramount.  In addition, amendment of the words “may pose a risk of 
harm” to “poses a risk of serious harm” means that a practitioner need only notify if there 
is an objective basis for believing that practitioner B does indeed pose a risk, and that the 
risk posed is serious.  For clarity, “serious harm” ought to be defined by the Act and may 
include, without limitation, actual or potential harm to the life or health of a patient.88  
 
The threshold for mandatory notification in Australia involves a “significant departure” 
from accepted standards.  This threshold should be adopted in New Zealand.  As in 
Australia, it can be contended that a significant departure is one which is serious and one 
which would be readily identifiable to any reasonable practitioner.  Certainly, a 
significant departure is something more than a minor deviation from accepted standards 
of practice.  Issuing guidance along the lines seen in Australia would assist practitioners 
to determine the “significant departure” threshold for reporting.89  Guidelines, which have 
the advantage of being relatively easy to amend if required, can also clarify that a single 
serious incident or progressively serious lapses in practice over a period of time would 
meet the threshold for reporting provided that there is also “serious harm”.    
 
The proposal does not alter the statutory language of the “required standard of 
competence”, which is already a defined term that has been the subject of judicial 
comment.  Nevertheless, consideration should be given to amending the definition of the 
“required standard of competence” by adding that the relevant standard is that which is 
set by the authority under s 118(i).  This would direct practitioners who are considering 
making a mandatory notification to consider the current competence standards for the 
relevant authority.   
  
88 HRANZ/DHB Agreed Guidelines for Competency Referrals states that a risk of serious harm may be 
indicated when “a patient may be seriously harmed; or the practitioner may pose a threat to more than one 
patient and as such the harm is collectively considered serious”.  Note that a “risk of serious harm” is 
relevant under s 39 of the Act when considering interim orders pending the outcome of a competence 
review or completion of certain remedial orders. 
89 It is suggested that HRANZ would be an appropriate body to publish these guidelines. 
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As currently worded, s 34(1) requires a practitioner to give written notice of competence 
concerns.  While written notice is commensurate with the seriousness of the notification, 
it also creates a level of formality that might not be necessary.  A practitioner should be 
permitted to make a notification either in writing (including by email) or verbally.  With 
verbal notifications it would also be crucial that the authority makes a written record of 
the verbal notification without delay, and this could be a statutory requirement in those 
circumstances.90  A verbal notification would also require an authority and its staff to 
ensure that they obtain adequate information to identify the practitioner making the 
notification and the basis on which the notification has been made.  Knowing the identity 
of the practitioner making the notification is necessary to protect against vexatious 
reports.  It is also consistent with the broad principles of natural justice of the practitioner 
who is the subject of the notification to be aware who has made the notification and the 
reasons for it.  If the practitioner making the notification wishes to protect his or her 
identity that will ultimately become a question for the authority having regard to the 
principles of access to and disclosure of personal information under the Privacy Act 
1993.91   
 
Like the current regime, practitioners who make a notification in good faith (whether 
mandatory or voluntary) should have immunity from civil or disciplinary proceedings.  
Protection could also be extended to any retaliatory action by an employer by adopting 
the personal grievance provisions similar to s 17 of the PDA.  While this protection 
would not prevent retaliation, it reinforces that reprisal for meeting an important statutory 
obligation is wholly unacceptable.  Alongside these statutory protections, authorities 
should ask themselves what sort of behaviour they expect to be observed with respect to 
those practitioners who make mandatory notifications.  There is room for ethical 
obligations to reflect an expectation that practitioners are to be supported in meeting their 
legal obligations, and not to be treated discourteously or disrespectfully for doing so.  In 
addition, the existence of a mandatory reporting obligation will permit authorities to set 
ethical obligations to reinforce the need to bring incompetent practice to the attention of 
the relevant regulatory authority.  
 
Finally, the mandatory obligation to report should be extended to capture persons in 
charge of organisations that provide health services and employers of health 
  
90 See for example Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld), s 146(3). 
91 Authorities are not subject to the Official Information Act 1982. 
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practitioners.92  In this way, the obligation to report is shared within the practice 
environment.  This has two possible advantages.  First, practitioners will not feel that they 
are singularly responsible for identifying and reporting competence concerns.  Secondly, 
it might have an unforeseen but desirable effect of genuinely encouraging early local 
(employer and organisation) interventions before the threshold for notification is met.  
This may well address any perceived risk that mandatory reporting will drive problems 
underground.  The motivation for early management of low level competence concerns 
might be more pronounced in a mandatory reporting regime than with discretionary 
notification.    
 
However the legislative change is framed, mandatory reporting would signal a shift in 
focus from protecting practitioner interests to protecting patient safety.  The way in which 
the regulated professions respond to legislative change will be as important, if not more 
so, than the regulatory response of the authorities.  It must be recognised that one final 
aspect relevant to the success or otherwise of a mandatory reporting regime is more 
difficult to achieve through legislative change: that is, practitioner ‘buy-in’.  It is hoped 
that this can be achieved through setting the reporting standard high, providing 
appropriate and accessible guidance on the threshold for mandatory reporting, and 
encouraging professional associations to focus their efforts in promoting early 
management and support for struggling practitioners and endorsing mandatory reporting 
in circumstances where it can reasonably be said that practitioner (in)competence   
compromises patient safety.  In the words of one Australian commentator, professional 
endorsement of mandatory reporting should be encouraged:93   
 
…in recognition of the profession’s past failings and the close alignment 
between the requirements of mandatory reporting and the profession’s 
assertions about its ethical obligations to take responsibility for members 
who practise at inadequate standards.  
  
A statutory requirement to notify an authority of competence concerns would, for some 
professions, replicate the ethical obligations that have existed for a number of years.  One 
argument in favour of mandatory reporting must be that it goes no further that most 
professions already require of themselves.  If mandatory reporting demands no more than 
  
92 See s 45 of the Act which extends the mandatory reporting of health concerns to these individuals.  Note 
also that by extending the notification to employers of practitioners this would cover the period of a 
practitioner’s employment and not solely circumstances where he or she resigns or is dismissed for reasons 
relating to competence. 
93 Malcolm Parker, above n 54 at 465. 
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the professions have expected of themselves then there is nothing to fear and plenty to 
gain in terms of patient safety and upholding patient rights. 
 
2. Retention of Discretionary Notification  
 
For completeness, the discretionary notification regime should be retained for reporting 
incompetent practice that does not meet the threshold for mandatory notification.  It is 
appropriate that those practitioners who have legitimate concerns about another 
practitioner’s competence to practise and who act in good faith in raising those concerns 
are given statutory immunity from civil or disciplinary action when making a voluntary 
notification.   
 
Finally, the Act is silent on whether persons other than practitioners, the HDC and 
employers can notify an authority of competence concerns.  This may be because it was 
assumed that a lay person is unable to identify when a practitioner is or is not meeting the 
required standard of competence.  But whether that assessment is able to be made by that 
person is irrelevant.  It is for the authority to determine the validity of the concern and its 
response to the notification.  An unregulated health professional, for example a health 
care assistant working alongside a regulated practitioner, or a receptionist, is as well 
placed as another practitioner to identify practice that may pose a risk of harm to patients.  
Similarly, a patient or a patient’s family may have valid concerns about the 
appropriateness of the care that is provided.  While there is nothing to prevent other 
people from notifying an authority of competence concerns, and perhaps those concerns 
make their way to the HDC in the first instance, it should be clarified that there is nothing 
to prevent voluntary notifications being made by any other person. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
Early recognition, early notification and a prompt response to competence concerns are 
consistent with protecting public health and safety.  The absence of a statutory obligation 
for practitioners to report competence concerns creates a risk that problems will go 
unreported and that patients may be exposed to harm.  Mandatory reporting obligations 
for the HDC and employers may come too late to avoid harm, and ethical obligations do 
not provide a safety net as they are inconsistent and have not, in any event, been 
enforced.  It is therefore debatable whether discretionary reporting is good enough to 
uphold patient rights and to meet the purpose of the Act.    
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A number of steps are required to test the appropriateness of discretionary reporting, 
including New Zealand based research into the sources of competence notifications and 
reporting behaviour across all regulated professions.  Subject to this research, education 
about patient rights, patient safety and the management and reporting of competence 
concerns is required, together with consistent guidance on the threshold for discretionary 
reporting and enforcement of existing ethical and professional obligations by appropriate 
agencies in appropriate cases.   
 
If the suggested improvements are ineffective to increase discretionary notifications of 
competence concerns then it may be that legislative change to require mandatory 
reporting in certain circumstances will become necessary.  In other words, if practitioners 
are not prepared to voluntarily raise competence concerns then it is almost inevitable that 
this requirement will be imposed upon them.  From a patient centric perspective, having 
regard both to the Code of Rights and the principal purpose of the Act, mandatory 
reporting has the potential to reinforce the central importance of patient safety and patient 
rights in the provision of health services.     
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XI Appendix 
 
 
Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 
 
34 Notification	that	practice	below	required	standard	of	competence	
  
(1) If a health practitioner (health practitioner A) has reason to believe that 
another health practitioner (health practitioner B) may pose a risk of harm to 
the public by practising below the required standard of competence, health 
practitioner A may give the Registrar of the authority that health practitioner B 
is registered with written notice of the reasons on which that belief is based. 
 
(2) If a person holding office as Health and Disability Commissioner or as Director 
of Proceedings under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 has 
reason to believe that a health practitioner may pose a risk of harm to the public 
by practising below the required standard of competence, the person must 
promptly give the Registrar of the responsible authority written notice of the 
circumstances on which that belief is based. 
 
(3) Whenever an employee employed as a health practitioner resigns or is 
dismissed from his or her employment for reasons relating to competence, the 
person who employed the employee immediately before that resignation or 
dismissal must promptly give the Registrar of the responsible authority written 
notice of the reasons for that resignation or dismissal. 
 
(4) No civil or disciplinary proceedings lie against any person in respect of a notice 
given under this section by that person, unless the person has acted in bad faith. 
 
 
